Last year I read an essay by Alvin Plantinga “Rationality and Religious Belief.” His essay struck me as a very sophisticated argument against the standard line that religious belief is “irrational.” This post is my attempt to summarise his argument. (Please note : my summary is by no means written to the standard one might expect from an epistemologist.)
Firstly, to introduce Plantinga. Alvin Platinga is a philosopher who speacialises in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of religion. He is best known for his re-working of “the free-will” response to the problem of evil question – how can the presence of evil be reconciled with a perfectly good, omnisicent and ominpotent god? His devasting review of Richard Dawkins book “The God Delusion” is worth looking at, viewable here: http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2007/002/1.21.html.)
“Rationality and Religious Belief” explores the question “is it rational, or reasonable, or rationally acceptable, to believe in God?” It is sophisticated and not easy to summarise, but nonetheless a compelling refutation of the standard line that religious belief is irrational. He deals with what he calls the “evidentialist objection’ to theistic belief, that “belief in God is irrational, or unreasonable, or noetically substandard because there is insufficient evidence for it.” This he traces to epistemological foundationalism (definition here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/ ) and the concept of properly basic, properly basic refers to those truths which are held to be incorrigible or self-evident. He holds that incorrigibility is not a necessary condition of proper basicality, and thus the evidentialist objection so far as it hinges on foundationalism is bankrupt. He then considers if a belief in God could be considered properly basic and considers the two standars objections. These are:
(i) If one has no evidence of the existence of God then one’s belief is “groundless, or gratuitous, or arbitary.”
(ii) If we accept that belief in God is properly basic then we must accept just any belief is properly basic, thus “throwing wide the gates to irrationalism and superstition.”
His refutation of (I) is quite sophistcated. He cites beliefs taken to be properly basic such as perceptiontual beliefs, memory beliefs and beliefs of ascribing the mental states of others, “in each of these cases, a belief is taken as basic, and in each case properly taken as basic. In each case there is some circumstance or condition that confers justification; there is a circumstance that serves as ground of justification.” He provides as account of proper basicality according to circumstance:
* In condition C, S is justified in taking p as basic.
As an example of this principle, he provides following proposition:
* I see a rose colored wall in front of me.
C will vary according to p depending on the nature and quality of perceptual experience.If I am wearing rose-colored glasses when I see the wall, I am not justified in believing that “I see a rose colored wall in front of me” is properly basic. There exists a further condition beyond “being appeared to” that cannot be fully articulated in order to be properly basic. Proper basicality occurs only in certain circumstances, but it is not the case that such belief is always “groundless”. He contends that, for theists, the evidence for God’s involvement in the world is such that their perception of God is like perceiving the rose-colored wall. They perceive:
* God is speaking to me;
* God has created all this;
* God disapproves of what I have done;
* God forgives me;
* God is to be thanked and praised.
These beliefs on their own are not properly basic, but serve as the conditions or circumstances for the properly basic belief that “God exists”. These conditions are necessary before one can assert proper basicality.
In his refutation of (ii) he asks, “How do we rightly arrive at or develop criteria for meaningfulness , or justified belief, or proper basicality?” He dubs (ii) the “Great Pumpkin Objection.” This view holds that reformed epistemology allows for a supersition like “the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween” to meet conditions of proper basicality. He argues that even in the absence of a criterion of proper basicality the reformed epistemologist can suppose there is a relevant difference between a belief in God and a belief in the Great Pumpkin. It does not follow from the rejection of foundationalist criteria, that there is no other criteria, “the Refrormed epistemologist may concur with Calvin in holding that God has implanted in us a natural tendency to see his hand in the world around us; the same cannot be said for the Great Pumpkin, there being no Great Pumpkin and no natural tendency to accept beliefs about the Great Pumpkin.”
Having encountered Plantinga I would feel very uneasy about saying such things as “a belief in God is irrational.” Further, I would be hesitant to toot the horn of atheism – especially the brand of atheism that so readily dismisses religious belief as irrational and akin to superstition.
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Steven Carr said
Plantinga supplies the perfect answer to charges that moral relativists cannot criticise people whose morals are different.
Is the belief ‘It is morally wrong to torture babies for fun’, a properly basic belief?
If we hold that moral beliefs are properly basic beliefs and do not need evidence for them, does this allow somebody to claim the following as a properly basic belief ‘It is morally right to torture babies for fun’?
We simply follow Plantinga and point out that there are as many people who believe it is morally right to torture babies for fun as there are believers in the Great Pumpkin.
We simply follow Plantinga and point out that there are is no natural tendency for people to believe it is morally right to torture babies for fun.
And , hey presto, moral relativism is as defensible as Plantinga’s ‘basic belief’ relativism.
PhillDoc said
Nice article as for me. I’d like to read a bit more concerning that theme.