There is no intelligent conservative body of thought or political philosophy. People who try to define conservative end up talking themselves in circles. You could say it means whatever the self-described conservative party does (in which case, it basically means populist, centrist or nationalist) or you could say it means the natural trait of most humans to prefer no or little change. But you can’t tie the word to any rational or consistent set of political ideas.

Perhaps the term “free-market conservative” has more philosophical substance… but that is purely because of the descriptive “free-market” part. And such people make up a small minority of the broader “conservative” group.

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Making Money $150 An Hour

Libertarians want small limited government. The constitutionalist strain within some conservative ranks is somewhat in alignment with this ideal. After all limits on the power of government need to be codified somewhere and constitutions are a key institution in such matters.

1. O’Day v Commonwealth [1964] HCA 46; (1964) 111 CLR 599 at 3.

2. Re Howard (1976) 1 NSWLR, 641 at p. 646 (Street CJ).

3. Pochi v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1982] HCA 60 at 9.

4. Coutts v Commonwealth [1985] HCA 40; (1985) 157 CLR 91 at 5 (Deane J).
5. Re Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Limited v Westpac Banking Corporation; the Northern Territory of Australia [1987] FCA 454 at 8.

6. Nolan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1988] HCA 45; (1988) 165 CLR 178 at 10-11.

7. The Queen v Sam Scott (1993) 114 ACTR 20 at 66-70.

8. Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) [1996] HCA 32; (1996) 189 CLR 253; (1996) 140 ALR 129.

9. Moller v Board of Examiners [1999] VSC 55 at 19-25.

10. Sue v Hill [1999] HCA 30; 199 CLR 462; 163 ALR 648 at 83-88.

11. Kingsman v Health Administration Corporation [2000] NSWSC 136 at 258-9.

12. Cameron v Peter D Beattie in his capacity as Premier & Ors [2001] QSC 115 at 3 and 9.

13. Re Patterson [2001] HCA 51; 207 CLR 391; 182 ALR 657 at 52, 92, 123, 125-9, 132 and 135 and 139.

14. Buchanan, Donald v Lindisfarne R & SLA Sub-Branch and Citizens Club Inc and Returned and Services League of Australia [2003] TASADT at 13, 69, 79, 81, 85, 87, 94, 115.

15. Shaw v Mima [2003] HCA 72; 218 CLR 28; 203 ALR 143; 78 ALJR 203 at 49, 51 and 83.

16. Buchanan, Donald v Lindisfarne R & SLA Sub-Branch and Citizens Club and The Returned and Services League of Australia Limited (Costs) [2004] TASADT 2 at 14-19, 21-24.

17. Singh v Commonwealth [2004] HCA 43; (2004) 222 CLR 322; (2004) 209 ALR 355; (2004) 78 ALJR 1383 at 35, 39, 40, 41 and 57.

18. O’Sullivan v Central Sydney Area Health Service (No 2) [2005] NSWADT 136 at 19.

19. Ruddock v Taylor [2005] HCA 48; 79 ALJR 1534; 221 ALR 32 at 58 and 215.

As for your example, R v the Governor of SA (1907), it would seem, then, that subsquent cases have overriden it. Luckily, this is not the case. Instead, what is the case is that you falsely quote and misrepresent what R v Governor of SA says. It declared the state Governors as head of *a* State (not THE state):

The GG also owes duty to the State, namely, South Australia:

“…it is clear that the duty would be one which he owed to the State collectively. It is not easy to see how, in such a case, he could perform this duty without dismissing his Ministers and finding others, and that power is manifestly *one the exercise of which could not be reviewed by any authority but the Sovereign*. The duty, therefore, is one of the duties which the Constitutional Head of a State owes to the State (and in the case of a Governor, but in a slightly different sense, to the Sovereign), and its performance must be enforced in the manner appropriate to the case of such duties. Instances of such duties—duties of imperfect obligation—are familiar to students of Constitutional Law….”

Sorry, what? One the exercise of which could not be reviewed by any authority but the Sovereign. Seems difficult to see how one can be Head of State, cough, I mean *a* State and be subject to a Sovereign’s “reviews”. This is because executive power is NOT vested in the GG, but the Sovereign. The Governor and GG is, in the words of the court, “officiating” (another word you omit) Constitutional Head of State. It implies the GG is simply a functionary, a servant:

“…The Governor, as the *officiating* Constitutional Head of the State, is accordingly named as the person to whom the notification is to be given, and the notification must be regarded as addressed to him in that capacity. So, in certifying to the Governor General the names of the senators elected, chosen, or appointed the Governor must be regarded as acting in the capacity of the Constitutional Head of the State, being in that capacity the proper channel of communication with the officiating Constitutional Head of the Commonwealth, the Governor General.

All this does then is say the GG is an effective Head of State, but not *the* symbolic Head of State. After all, given the Oxford dictionary (State Chamber of Commerce) defines Head of State as being a Sovereign, and given the precedent is calling the King a Sovereign, this allows us to conclude the King is Head of State. A head of state is a Sovereign. The King is our Sovereign. Therefore, the King is Head of State. R v Governor SA simply declared the GG as “the constitutional Head” – but the PRECEDENT quickly clarifies that the GG owes “loyalty to the King” and clearly EMPOWERS the King with ultimate power of review (of executive power by the GG):

“…But the question remains: To whom does he owe this duty? A somewhat analogous duty is cast upon the State Governors under the Constitutions of the States, all of which provide that upon a dissolution of the Houses of Assembly the writs for a general election are to be issued by the Governor. It has never been suggested that if the Governor failed to issue the writs a mandamus would lie from a State Court to compel him to do so. There is, of course, a remedy in such a case but it is to be sought from the direct intervention of the Sovereign and not by recourse to a Court of law….”

In other words, a functionary role to the GG, but power – which is what a Head of State has – to the King. Indeed, it seems difficult to see how they used the term when the term began being used in the 1950s. Anyways, even if, they used it in the sense we did, it simply goes to show ultimate power resides with the King.

So, really, the above argument is weak as far as precedent is concerned and omits a critical reading of the precedent in question.

Cheers,

- Spadijer

The current Australian flag is divisive and misunderstood. I tire of ignorant youths who drunkenly slobber about the hundreds of thousand of people who died for. Very few of Australia’s great wars were fought under this blue ensign of ours, and the brave people who did fight were fighting for each other, the Empire, the country, God knows what else, but not the flag. Read some war diaries to confirm that point of view.

As for constitutional protection for the flag? Why? We don’t protect freedom of speech, freedom or religion etc. For what benefit? To keep it locked in stasis?

Burning the flag? Who cares if someone does burn a flag? They don’t like Australia? Too bad. Any one has got the right to tell me they don’t like Australia. I happen to, and I happen to disagree vehemently with those who don’t. Burning a piece of cloth (or plastic) however does not change the world one iota. What such a ban would do, however, is encourage protesters to engage in exactly that behaviour, since it is illegal and more outrageous. Doesn’t bother me, but do you really want to encourage people to burn the flag?

And what would penal labour achieve?

I am much more offended by hair-brained youths spouting ignorant nonsense about the spirit of the Southern Cross (can’t it be seen in any other country) with flags drapped across their back like a Batman cape telling anyone who looks different to them to eff off home.

Do you really want our flag to be a symbol of divisiveness?

Is the belief ‘It is morally wrong to torture babies for fun’, a properly basic belief?

If we hold that moral beliefs are properly basic beliefs and do not need evidence for them, does this allow somebody to claim the following as a properly basic belief ‘It is morally right to torture babies for fun’?

We simply follow Plantinga and point out that there are as many people who believe it is morally right to torture babies for fun as there are believers in the Great Pumpkin.

We simply follow Plantinga and point out that there are is no natural tendency for people to believe it is morally right to torture babies for fun.

And , hey presto, moral relativism is as defensible as Plantinga’s ‘basic belief’ relativism.

Keep up the good work!