1. O’Day v Commonwealth [1964] HCA 46; (1964) 111 CLR 599 at 3.

2. Re Howard (1976) 1 NSWLR, 641 at p. 646 (Street CJ).

3. Pochi v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1982] HCA 60 at 9.

4. Coutts v Commonwealth [1985] HCA 40; (1985) 157 CLR 91 at 5 (Deane J).
5. Re Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Limited v Westpac Banking Corporation; the Northern Territory of Australia [1987] FCA 454 at 8.

6. Nolan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1988] HCA 45; (1988) 165 CLR 178 at 10-11.

7. The Queen v Sam Scott (1993) 114 ACTR 20 at 66-70.

8. Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) [1996] HCA 32; (1996) 189 CLR 253; (1996) 140 ALR 129.

9. Moller v Board of Examiners [1999] VSC 55 at 19-25.

10. Sue v Hill [1999] HCA 30; 199 CLR 462; 163 ALR 648 at 83-88.

11. Kingsman v Health Administration Corporation [2000] NSWSC 136 at 258-9.

12. Cameron v Peter D Beattie in his capacity as Premier & Ors [2001] QSC 115 at 3 and 9.

13. Re Patterson [2001] HCA 51; 207 CLR 391; 182 ALR 657 at 52, 92, 123, 125-9, 132 and 135 and 139.

14. Buchanan, Donald v Lindisfarne R & SLA Sub-Branch and Citizens Club Inc and Returned and Services League of Australia [2003] TASADT at 13, 69, 79, 81, 85, 87, 94, 115.

15. Shaw v Mima [2003] HCA 72; 218 CLR 28; 203 ALR 143; 78 ALJR 203 at 49, 51 and 83.

16. Buchanan, Donald v Lindisfarne R & SLA Sub-Branch and Citizens Club and The Returned and Services League of Australia Limited (Costs) [2004] TASADT 2 at 14-19, 21-24.

17. Singh v Commonwealth [2004] HCA 43; (2004) 222 CLR 322; (2004) 209 ALR 355; (2004) 78 ALJR 1383 at 35, 39, 40, 41 and 57.

18. O’Sullivan v Central Sydney Area Health Service (No 2) [2005] NSWADT 136 at 19.

19. Ruddock v Taylor [2005] HCA 48; 79 ALJR 1534; 221 ALR 32 at 58 and 215.

As for your example, R v the Governor of SA (1907), it would seem, then, that subsquent cases have overriden it. Luckily, this is not the case. Instead, what is the case is that you falsely quote and misrepresent what R v Governor of SA says. It declared the state Governors as head of *a* State (not THE state):

The GG also owes duty to the State, namely, South Australia:

“…it is clear that the duty would be one which he owed to the State collectively. It is not easy to see how, in such a case, he could perform this duty without dismissing his Ministers and finding others, and that power is manifestly *one the exercise of which could not be reviewed by any authority but the Sovereign*. The duty, therefore, is one of the duties which the Constitutional Head of a State owes to the State (and in the case of a Governor, but in a slightly different sense, to the Sovereign), and its performance must be enforced in the manner appropriate to the case of such duties. Instances of such duties—duties of imperfect obligation—are familiar to students of Constitutional Law….”

Sorry, what? One the exercise of which could not be reviewed by any authority but the Sovereign. Seems difficult to see how one can be Head of State, cough, I mean *a* State and be subject to a Sovereign’s “reviews”. This is because executive power is NOT vested in the GG, but the Sovereign. The Governor and GG is, in the words of the court, “officiating” (another word you omit) Constitutional Head of State. It implies the GG is simply a functionary, a servant:

“…The Governor, as the *officiating* Constitutional Head of the State, is accordingly named as the person to whom the notification is to be given, and the notification must be regarded as addressed to him in that capacity. So, in certifying to the Governor General the names of the senators elected, chosen, or appointed the Governor must be regarded as acting in the capacity of the Constitutional Head of the State, being in that capacity the proper channel of communication with the officiating Constitutional Head of the Commonwealth, the Governor General.

All this does then is say the GG is an effective Head of State, but not *the* symbolic Head of State. After all, given the Oxford dictionary (State Chamber of Commerce) defines Head of State as being a Sovereign, and given the precedent is calling the King a Sovereign, this allows us to conclude the King is Head of State. A head of state is a Sovereign. The King is our Sovereign. Therefore, the King is Head of State. R v Governor SA simply declared the GG as “the constitutional Head” – but the PRECEDENT quickly clarifies that the GG owes “loyalty to the King” and clearly EMPOWERS the King with ultimate power of review (of executive power by the GG):

“…But the question remains: To whom does he owe this duty? A somewhat analogous duty is cast upon the State Governors under the Constitutions of the States, all of which provide that upon a dissolution of the Houses of Assembly the writs for a general election are to be issued by the Governor. It has never been suggested that if the Governor failed to issue the writs a mandamus would lie from a State Court to compel him to do so. There is, of course, a remedy in such a case but it is to be sought from the direct intervention of the Sovereign and not by recourse to a Court of law….”

In other words, a functionary role to the GG, but power – which is what a Head of State has – to the King. Indeed, it seems difficult to see how they used the term when the term began being used in the 1950s. Anyways, even if, they used it in the sense we did, it simply goes to show ultimate power resides with the King.

So, really, the above argument is weak as far as precedent is concerned and omits a critical reading of the precedent in question.

Cheers,

- Spadijer